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SAMANTAR, OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
by
Peter B. Rutledge ∗
The Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar is most easily understood as
holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not cover claims
against individual foreign government officers. Instead of stopping at
that rather unassailable conclusion, the Court took the more
controversial step of holding that individual officers still could be entitled
to immunity as a matter of federal common law. This Symposium Essay,
part of a larger set of papers addressing Samantar, criticizes that
conclusion. It criticizes the Court for failing to justify this exceptional
exercise of its common-law-making power and identifies the pitfalls of this
under-theorized conception of federal common law. Instead, this Essay
argues, the Court should have refrained from exercising its power here.
Such an approach would have had the salutary effect of forcing Congress
to fill an obvious gap and, thereby, perhaps bring United States law more
into harmony with the prevailing international norms on the subject.
Finally, the Essay anticipates potential criticisms to this approach and
explains how other doctrines can address those criticisms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court addressed a longsimmering dispute over whether the protections of the Foreign Sovereign
1
Immunities Act (“FSIA”) extended to individual government officers. All
nine justices agreed that it generally did not, though the Court’s opinion
left open the possibility that certain suits against foreign officials could be
the functional equivalent of a suit against the state and, thereby, qualify
for the FSIA’s protections. Otherwise, foreign government officials are, at
most, entitled to an official immunity at federal common law, the precise
contours of which the Court left unaddressed.
While the Court at least can be praised for wading into this
increasingly important area, its decision is remarkably unsatisfying. The
decision fails to articulate a coherent theoretical foundation, fails to
provide sufficient guidance about the scope of this federal common law
of immunity, and fails to trace through the implications of its holding.
The unfortunate result will be at least several years of litigation as lower
courts (and litigants) struggle to make sense of the Court’s decision.
This result is especially troubling for two reasons. First, it concerns
(at least partly) a jurisdictional rule; such rules should be clear to both
the parties and the courts. Second, suits against foreign government
officials easily can touch upon the foreign relations of the United States,
and the lack of clear standards about when those suits can go forward
threatens to frustrate the management of those relations.
Instead of adopting this half-baked solution, the Court should have
opted for a more radical approach: it should have held that the FSIA did
not cover foreign government officials and that federal common law did not
fill in the gap. While this result might have had the short-term
consequence of leaving some government officials exposed to suit, it
would have had the salutary effect of a forcing rule. It would have
encouraged the political branches either to amend the FSIA or to
formulate a new legislative structure to govern the immunity of foreign
government officials. The result would have provided a sounder
architecture for these suits and, contrary to an expected criticism, would
not have raised insurmountable concerns about the rule’s effect on
pending or future cases.
This Essay develops this thesis in three parts. The first part provides a
general overview on sovereign immunity law with a special emphasis on
official immunity. The second elaborates upon the flaws in Samantar and
defends the proposition that the Court should not have allowed vague
notions of federal common law to fill the apparent gap in the federal law
governing sovereign immunity. The third charts an alternative course
that the Court could have followed and anticipates criticisms.

1

130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010).
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II. FOUR ERAS OF IMMUNITY
A bit of background helps to place Samantar in context. For nearly
the first century and a half of the nation’s history, United States courts
2
followed an absolute theory of sovereign immunity. Under that theory,
foreign sovereigns were not answerable for their conduct in another
3
country’s domestic courts. This approach comported with other postWestphalian doctrines such as those governing judicial jurisdiction (i.e.,
personal jurisdiction) and legislative jurisdiction (i.e., the
extraterritoriality of federal statutes) that gave primacy to the power of
4
nation-states. It effectively blocked any suits against individual foreign
government officials as well. As extensions of the state, these officials
enjoy the state’s absolute immunity, and little reported case law addresses
5
the precise issue during this period.
While courts linked the immunity of the foreign state with the
immunity of foreign state officials, that linkage was not strictly necessary.
Domestic sovereign immunity doctrines provide an interesting
counterpoint. There, by contrast, the Court showed a willingness in the
nineteenth century already to extend state officials a narrower immunity
than that extended to the state at least where, under agency principles,
the state actor could be said to be acting ultra vires or beyond the scope of
6
his authority. Yet this line of reasoning did not, as far as I can tell,
penetrate the more formalistic doctrines governing foreign sovereign
7
immunity.
By the early twentieth century, however, the absolute approach to
sovereign immunity began to erode, and the jurisprudence entered a
second era. In cases like Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v.
The Navemar, the Court displayed a greater willingness to entertain suits
8
against the foreign sovereign. The critical determinant, however, was the
position of the executive branch. In cases where the executive branch
filed a suggestion of immunity, the Court consistently acceded to that

2

See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 220 (4th ed. 2007).
3
See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137
(1812).
4
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 78–80, 615–17.
5
See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); Jones v. Le Tombe,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 384, 385 (1798); Actions Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81, 81
(1797); Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794).
6
See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887).
7
The petitioner in Samantar later advanced a form of this argument. Brief of
Appellants at 32 & n.19, Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 071893).
8
See 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938).
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9

suggestion. In cases where they did not, the Court was more likely to
10
exercise jurisdiction.
Two features marked this second era of sovereign immunity. First,
the source of the immunity shifted from a doctrine grounded in
principles of international law or constitutional law to one grounded in
11
principles of comity. While comity is an elusive concept subject to many
meanings, in this context it can be understood as an effort to ensuring
12
harmonious relations among nation-states. Second, and relatedly, this
era represented perhaps the high-water mark of deference to the views of
the executive branch. In other words, the court rested its immunity
decisions not simply on its own conception of “comity” (as it did, for
13
example, in the judgment-enforcement context). Instead, it allowed the
executive branch to serve as the institution defining the effect of a lawsuit
on comity and, essentially, deferred to its determination.
If immunity is viewed in light of comity, the role of the executive
branch makes some sense. When the executive branch indicates that a
case implicates an immunity, it simultaneously is signaling the
importance of the case to the foreign relations of the United States.
Conversely, when the executive branch declines to file a suggestion of
immunity, that inaction likewise signals to the Court that entertaining
jurisdiction is unlikely to have much impact on foreign relations.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the United States arguably
entered a third era of sovereign immunity law (though it might also be
seen as simply an extension of the second). The seminal event in this era
14
was the release of the famous Tate Letter. Penned by the State
Department’s legal advisor, that letter embraced what had come to be

9

See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587–89 (1943).
10
The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 75.
11
There is a competing view here. Under the competing view, both the first and
second eras were rooted in comity, with the Court treating comity in the first era as a
type of derogable customary international law. The only difference was the treatment
of the executive branch’s position. For a thoughtful articulation of this view, see
William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: Some Lessons from
History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169, 188–89 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/
2010/12/17/dodge.html. While I agree with Professor Dodge on the latter point (the
evolution in the role of the executive branch), I think his treatment of Schooner
Exchange, while certainly plausible, does not quite capture its relationship to other
doctrines (mentioned in the text) which anchored customary international law in
something more than comity.
12
See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010); William S. Dodge,
International Comity in American Courts (ASIL Int’l Econ. Law Interest Grp. 2009),
available at http://www.asil.org/files/dodge.pdf.
13
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227–28 (1895).
14
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Dep’t of State, to Philip
B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 984, 984–85
(1952).
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15

known as the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Under that
theory, the sovereign remained absolutely immune from suit for acts
taken in its sovereign capacity. It surrendered that immunity, however,
when it acted in a non-sovereign (most notably a commercial) capacity.
In theory, this evolution held forth the promise of standardizing the
immunity determination. That is, the sovereign/non-sovereign line
offered the possibility that the immunity determination might turn on a
legal standard rather than a political calculus. In practice, however, the
executive branch continued to control the immunity determination. It
did so by deciding whether to classify a particular act as sovereign or non16
sovereign. As with the prior era, courts largely deferred to this
determination. The labels had changed, but the basic allocation of power
among government institutions had not.
This era also introduced a meaningful distinction between suits
against a foreign state and suits against foreign state officials. An
exhaustive survey of precedents during this era identifies several cases
where the executive branch opined on the immunity of individual
17
foreign government officials from suit.
While the executive branch enjoyed great power during this era (and
the preceding one), this power was not altogether welcome. For while
the executive branch could use its power over the immunity suggestion
(or sovereign/non-sovereign classification) as a source of diplomatic
leverage, this authority also subjected the executive branch to regular
pressure from foreign states and their patrons to adopt a favorable
18
position when the state was subject to litigation. Such overtures were
not always welcome, particularly where the political dynamics of the suit
were complex (such as in a case where a major United States company
was suing the foreign sovereign). In such cases, the executive branch was
put in the dilemma of supporting the foreign state (and risk
undermining the interests of an important domestic entity) or not
19
intervening (and risk riling relations with an ally). Unsurprisingly,
15

BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 221.
Id. at 221–22.
17
See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State: May 1952 to
January 1977, in 1977 DIGEST app., at 1020.
18
See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 34–35.(1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep’t
of State).
19
Similar issues have arisen more recently in the context of statements of interest
in litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. In this regard, recent comments of John
Bellinger, former Legal Advisor to the executive branch, are especially apt: “[C]aseby-case participation can put the Executive Branch in a difficult spot . . . . Foreign
governments will continue to press U.S. administrations to weigh in on their behalf in
ATS litigation. If the Executive is expected to weigh in when litigation presents
foreign policy concerns, courts may come to infer (wrongly) from its silence in other
cases that there are no such concerns. In addition, foreign governments may come to
regard the Executive’s decisions whether or not to file as a reflection of the United
16
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therefore, the executive branch’s litigation position during this era was
20
riddled with inconsistencies that were difficult to reconcile.
Against this background, the FSIA ushered in the fourth era of
21
sovereign immunity law in 1976. The stated purpose of the FSIA was to
de-politicize immunity determinations and to inject a predictability and
22
consistency into the issue. The law did so by setting forth a general
23
grant of immunity. It then subjected that general grant to a series of
exceptions such as waiver, commercial activity, and non-commercial
24
tort. This new scheme largely reallocated power over the immunity
determination from the executive branch to Congress and the courts.
Congress initially controlled the scope of the immunity through its
definition of the entities entitled to it and the scope of the exceptions.
The courts secondarily controlled the scope of the immunity through
decisions that filled the statute’s interstices.
Critical for purposes of this Essay, the statute defined the range of
entities entitled to the FISA’s protections. Technically, the immunity
25
extended to “foreign state[s].” This term was, however, further defined
to encompass three broad categories—the foreign state proper, political
subdivisions of the foreign state, and agencies or instrumentalities of the
26
While the first two categories were relatively
foreign state.
27
straightforward in most cases, agency or instrumentality required
further definition. It included “organ[s]” of the state (a term not

States’ view of its bilateral relationship with that government. Domestically, foreign
policy submissions will often be read as partisan support for the activities of foreign
governments over the deserving interests of the plaintiff victims.” John B. Bellinger
III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other
Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 11 (2009).
20
See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2004); Verlinden
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights
Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 9, 19 (2009).
21
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
22
See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
23
Id. § 1604.
24
Id. § 1605.
25
Id. § 1604.
26
Id. § 1603.
27
One nested ambiguity in the statute was how to identify whether a defendant
satisfied the definition of a foreign state proper. Jurisprudence following the FSIA’s
enactment has followed one of two main roads. Most courts have analyzed the
question based on whether the executive branch has recognized the state (a residual
area in which the executive branch’s views on the immunity determination can be
effectively dispositive). A second approach has been to apply a more legalistic
definition to the concept of the state, borrowing from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987). See BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 2, at 239.
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otherwise defined in the statute) and corporate or other similar entities
28
that were majority-owned by the state.
Yet the statute contained a gaping hole—it did not address the
extent to which individual foreign government officials enjoyed
29
immunity. This lacuna created a classic interpretive dilemma for lower
courts. If they concluded that the FSIA simply did not cover government
officials (and thus they enjoyed no special immunity from suit in the
United States), then creative plaintiffs could perform an end-run around
the FSIA simply by suing the government official rather than the
sovereign itself. On the other hand, if they concluded that individual
foreign government officials continued to enjoy immunity from suit, that
conclusion created some tension with the FSIA’s overall purpose of
depoliticizing questions of foreign sovereign immunity through a
comprehensive federal statute that set forth predictable standards
applicable in both federal and state courts.
Given this interpretive dilemma, federal courts unsurprisingly
30
Some courts concluded that,
reached conflicting conclusions.
notwithstanding the awkward textual fit, the FSIA continued to cover
31
individual government officers. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank was an early important decision
32
exemplifying this approach. By contrast, other courts concluded that
the FSIA did not cover foreign government officials, but that such
officials continued to enjoy the common-law immunity that predated the
FSIA’s enactment. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Enahoro v. Abubakar
33
supplied the most thorough articulation of this position.
A third position was available to courts—namely that, following the
FSIA’s enactment, individual government officials no longer enjoyed any
immunity from suit. Such an approach would have avoided the dilemmas
confronted by the two preceding approaches. It avoids any tension with
the FSIA’s language (and may well have prompted Congress to adopt a
legislative fix). It also avoids any ambiguity about the legitimacy and
scope of a federal common-law immunity. Yet, except in rare cases
involving United States citizens who claimed to have been acting on

28

28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003).
The reasons for this lacuna are unclear. Some sources suggest that Congress
simply did not consider the matter while others suggest that Congress intentionally
meant to exclude it. See Chimène I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley
and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 6–7 (2010), http://www.yjil.org/docs/
pub/o-36-keitner-officially-immune.pdf.
30
Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2680 (2011).
31
Some academic scholarship supported this view. See Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 20, at 9–10. For criticism, see Keitner, supra note 29, at 6–7.
32
912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
33
408 F.3d 877, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2005).
29
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34

behalf of foreign sovereign entities, no reported decisions appear to
have followed this path.
By the time the petitioners in Samantar sought certiorari, the
doctrine was in disarray. Two circuits had held that the FSIA did not
cover foreign government officials, while at least five others (arguably)
35
held that it did.
Samantar offered a good vehicle in which to resolve this conflict. The
original case involved a suit by natives of Somalia who alleged that
Samantar, the former Prime Minister, First Vice President and Minister
of Defense, had authorized extrajudicial killings and torture of the
36
plaintiffs or their family members during the 1980s. During that time,
the United States formally recognized the military regime, of which
37
Samantar was a part, as the lawful government of Somalia. Following
the fall of the military regime, Samantar fled the country in 1991 and
38
eventually became a resident of Virginia. Thus, by the time plaintiffs
commenced their suit, Samantar was a former high-government official
of a foreign state.
The district court, relying on a prior circuit precedent, held that the
FSIA covered Samantar, at least insofar as he was acting within the scope
of his authority, and (concluding that he was) further held that none of
39
FSIA’s exceptions applied. Consequently, the district court concluded
40
41
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit reversed.
It held that the FSIA did not apply to individual government officers but
remanded the case to the district court to decide whether a common-law
42
immunity protected Samantar.
Affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, the Supreme Court held
43
that the FSIA generally does not cover individual government officers.
That conclusion, the Court rightly recognized, flowed from the FSIA’s
text and structure which simply did not contemplate individual
44
defendants within its design. While holding that (most) suits against
34

See, e.g., In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1996); Rimsat, Ltd. v.
Hilliard (In re Rimsat, Ltd.), 207 B.R. 964, 968 (D.D.C. 1997); Jugobanka d.d. N.Y.
Agency v. Unis Int’l Corp., No. 93 C 1865, 1995 WL 3987, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5,
1995).
35
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.4 (2010) (summarizing split).
36
Id. at 2282.
37
See id. at 2283; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 4, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter Brief for the
United States].
38
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283.
39
Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *8–14 (E.D. Va. Aug.
1, 2007).
40
Id. at *15.
41
Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 2009).
42
Id. at 383–84.
43
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283 n.3, 2289.
44
Id. at 2286–89.
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foreign government officials fell outside the FSIA, the Court did not
hang them out to dry. Instead, aligning itself with the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Enahoro, the Court held that such officials might enjoy a
45
common-law immunity. Unfortunately, the Court provided virtually no
guidance on the scope of that immunity, instead remanding the case so
that the district court, in the first instance, could decide whether
46
Samantar was entitled to immunity under that (unspecified) standard.
III. FOUR PUZZLES
While Samantar deserves some nominal praise for resolving the
immediate circuit split, the decision is deeply unsatisfying. The
theoretical underpinnings of this exercise of federal common-law power
are woefully underdeveloped. Moreover, even assuming that the Court
properly exercised its common-law power in this setting, the decision
leaves unanswered a host of questions about the scope of individual
immunity and the relationship between that immunity and the FSIA’s
framework. Finally, the decision renews (but does not resolve) the old
wars over the proper branch of government to control the immunity
determination. In these respects, Samantar may well have unleashed more
doctrinal problems than it resolved.
A. What’s the authority for the federal common law?
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Court’s opinion is its
unexamined assumption that its power to articulate federal common law
extends to the doctrine of the immunity of foreign government officials.
In recent years, the Court’s power to assert federal common law has been
a hotly debated issue, including in matters of international civil
47
litigation. Yet in Samantar all nine justices accepted the proposition that
the Court’s post-Erie power to articulate federal common law extends to a
48
field that abuts one where Congress has spoken.
The Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain vividly illustrates the
need to articulate clearly the source and basis of the federal common-law
power. Sosa concerned the Alien Tort Statute, which authorizes federal
court jurisdiction over suits brought by aliens alleging torts committed in

45

Id. at 2292–93.
Id. at 2293.
47
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 11–13.
48
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. Of course, the fault here may not simply lie with
the Samantar Court but, instead, the earlier post-Erie decisions of Ex parte Republic of
Peru and Hoffman which asserted the power to make federal common law in this area.
For a thoughtful argument that those decisions were wrong as an original matter, see
Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against
the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 928 (2011). Special thanks to Bill Dodge for
pushing me on this argument.
46
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49

violation of the law of nations. In Sosa, the Court held that this grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction encompassed a limited number of historically
rooted causes of action (like violations of safe passage by ambassadors)
and also contemplated a limited number of new torts created as a matter
of federal common law so long as the norm, defined at a high level of
specificity, had achieved a degree of acceptance among civilized nations
comparable to the acceptance of the historically rooted actions
recognized at the time of the ATS’s enactment in the late eighteenth
50
century. The Sosa majority thought this approach, coupled with various
51
prudential devices, would apply a meaningful check on ATS litigation.
Yet it had precisely the opposite effect. This opaque standard instantly
invited widespread academic criticism and spawned significant confusion
52
among lower courts about when a norm satisfied the Sosa standard.
Tellingly, even though the Court in Sosa claimed that the standard set a
high bar and, thus, should limit the number of suits, it appears that, in
certain sectors, more ATS suits were filed after Sosa than prior to that
decision (during the two decades where the ATS’s scope was completely
53
unaddressed by the Court and parties fought on an open terrain). Sosa
thus demonstrates the perils of announcing a vague federal common-law
standard in a Supreme Court opinion and leaving the lower courts (and
litigants) to sort out the messy details. Compared to the rule announced
in Samantar, the rule in Sosa is a model of clarity.
49

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. The Alien Tort Statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2006).
50
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
51
Id. at 725–31; see also id. at 739–51 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
52
See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 33; Eugene Kontorovich,
Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien
Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004). Indeed, even in the one instance
where Congress spoke clearly in this area—namely the Torture Victim Protection
Act—courts cannot agree over whether the TVPA states the exclusive remedy for
torture claims or, instead, such claims are also actionable under Sosa as a matter of
federal common law. Compare, e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the TVPA “occup[ied] the field” for torture claims), and
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 664 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Surely, caution in
developing a cause of action under federal common law is appropriate in situations
such as this where Congress has already established a cause of action and explicitly
defined its scope in the TVPA.”), with Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148,
1154 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the TVPA merely extended to United States
citizens the right to bring torture claims, a right unavailable to them under the ATS),
and Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 686 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that
the TVPA does not preclude torture claims under federal common law against nonnatural persons). See generally Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085–
86 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (collecting cases).
53
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct.
2424 (2008) (No. 07-919) (mem.), aff’g Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504
F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In the interest of disclosure, I should note that
I filed this brief on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce.
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Of course, one might distinguish between a federal common-lawmaking power to create a cause of action and a federal common-lawmaking power to generate an affirmative defense (like immunity).
Leaving the latter a bit vague is less problematic, so the argument goes,
because there is less harm in judicial overextension of a liability-limiting
(as opposed to liability-creating) rule of federal common law. This
argument assumes, of course, that federal courts will use their commonlaw power generously (risking overextensions of the immunity) rather
than sparingly (risking insufficient immunity). Moreover, the
defensibility of that distinction depends critically on the value
underpinning one’s view of federal common-law power. If the underlying
value is comity, then perhaps the distinction makes sense. But if the
underlying value is separation of powers (or simply a more modest view
of judicial lawmaking power), then the two are not so easily
distinguished. Vague and unprincipled assertions of the power to make
federal common law, whether liability-creating or liability-limiting,
trample upon the power of the legislative branch to regulate a matter (or
leave it unregulated).
B. What’s the scope of the common-law immunity for foreign officials?
The ultimate section of Samantar can be read to support the notion
54
that this common-law immunity survives the FSIA. Exactly how that
immunity operates is something that Samantar leaves remarkably
55
unclear. Footnote 17 of the Court’s opinion could be read to suggest an
“official capacity” or “scope of authority” test, but then the Court
56
explicitly backs away from endorsing that (or any other) test. Several
academic commentators have sought to address this issue, but none of
those accounts are satisfactory.
Under one account, the Court’s lack of clarification on this point
may be defended on the ground that it was entirely appropriate for the
Court to leave such issues to lower courts to work out in the first
57
instance. It is true that the Court routinely makes this move in its
opinions, but this was not the sort of issue warranting such a punt. For
one thing, this was not some novel theory cooked up by a creative
Supreme Court advocate that had never been tested below. Instead, the
issue had been raised below and had been an established theory among
the lower courts for how to resolve issues of individual immunity. For
another thing, the issue did not involve an application of law to fact but,
54

See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292–93 (2010).
See Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN
BAG 2D 61, 68 (2010) (“The central challenge for the district court in Samantar on
remand, and for courts in other cases, will be to determine which acts are entitled to
immunity, and which acts are not.”).
56
See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 n.17.
57
I thank Ed Swaine for his thoughtful reactions to my post on Opinio Juris on
this point.
55
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instead, a pure question of law, which the Supreme Court is as equipped
to address as a lower federal court. (On this score, it might have been
justifiable for the court to remand the case for further factual
development on whether Samantar satisfied whatever test the Court
58
articulated, a different result than remanding so the lower courts could
try to divine the proper test from the entrails in the Court’s opinion.)
Furthermore, this particular question of law would have justified more
clarity from the Court. As the Court has noted elsewhere, immunity
defenses protect officials not simply from liability but from the burdens
59
of suit. By remanding the case for further articulation (and likely
appeal) on the proper test, Samantar will be forced to endure several
rounds of litigation even if he ultimately prevails. Finally, as a prudential
matter, the Court could have afforded to do more. Its view on the central
immunity question was unanimous (with the justices disagreeing only on
60
the validity of resorting to legislative history), so surely the Court might
have attempted to reach some consensus on the proper standard even if,
in doing so, it risked splitting off a couple of justices who took a different
view about the proper test.
Under another account, the Court’s opinion either should be read
to endorse the pre-FSIA “official immunity” test or, alternatively, courts
61
should adopt this test on remand as a matter of federal common law.
62
That view suffers from several flaws. For one thing, the principle that
acts of Congress will not be lightly read to derogate from the common
law presupposes the existence of a well-established common-law
principle. As even the Solicitor General’s brief itself acknowledges,
virtually no cases addressed the issue of official immunity as of the time
58
As it did, for example, in Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546
(1999).
59
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–15 (1982).
60
See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2293 (Alito, J., concurring), 2293 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 2293–94 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment).
61
The Seventh Circuit implicitly proposed this approach in the Abubakar
litigation. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2005).
62
The limited experience following Samantar does not make one sanguine about
the prospects for a clear test. Following remand of the case, the Justice Department
filed a statement of interest sharing the State Department’s views that Samantar was
not entitled to official immunity. See Statement of Interest of the United States of
America at 7, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Statement of Interest]. Rather than anchoring this view in Samantar’s
conduct, the State Department rested on two obscure facts—(a) the lack of a formally
recognized government in Somalia and (b) Samantar’s current residence in the
United States. Moreover, the brief went to great pains to explain how its view was
informed by customary international law and how the factors articulated by the State
Department were not exhaustive. As I have explained elsewhere in greater detail, this
vague position hardly provides predictability in this area and does not represent the
sort of principled litigating position that, under normal principles of administrative
law, would be entitled to much deference. See Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and
Executive Power, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2011).
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of the FSIA’s enactment. So the idea that Congress implicitly intended
to leave this area of law alone is dubious at best. For another thing, this
standard simply begs the point about how one describes the scope of
authority. Suppose that a covert agent assassinates a foreign official;
suppose that a government official refuses to issue a title to a real estate
transfer (which it’s his job to do) because he’s been bribed. Do these acts
fall within the scope of the officials’ authority? Even if courts can coalesce
around a test, what law governs the question? Federal common law, one
might naturally say. But not so fast. How can that approach be squared
with the scope-of-employment prong under the non-commercial tort
exception? Lower courts disagree over what conflicts principles (federal
or state) and what substantive principles (federal, state, or international)
64
govern these questions. Consequently, Samantar creates an odd
situation where different sources of law inform the same inquiry,
depending solely on the identity of the defendant (which could produce
particularly confusing results when both the foreign state and the
individual officer are defendants).
C. When is a suit against an individual government official the functional
equivalent of a suit against a foreign state?
As noted above, the Court fudged on part of its opinion in Samantar.
While holding that the FSIA generally does not cover suits against
individual officers, the Court acknowledged that some suits against
individual officers are indistinguishable from suits against the foreign
65
state itself. In those circumstances, the FSIA applies.
Yet the Court offers virtually no guidance on when such a state of
affairs arises. One can tease only three hints from its opinion. First, the
Court implicitly holds that the instant suit against Samantar does not fall
66
within this category. But whether that is because Samantar is a former
official or because of some other feature of the case, the Court leaves
unclear. Second, the Court acknowledges the test from section 66 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States—where a
judgment against the foreign official “would be to enforce a rule of law
67
against the state.” Yet while acknowledging the test, the Court explicitly
63
See Brief for the United States, supra note 37, at 9–12, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130
S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555). This sets official immunity apart from other
immunities like diplomatic immunity that enjoy a much richer history. See BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 242, 255–57. Moreover, though commentators regularly
overlook this fact, diplomatic immunity is formally domesticated in the United States
by statute, namely the Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254d (2006).
64
Compare Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 923 F.2d 957, 959–
61 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying state choice-of-law principles under FSIA), with Liu v.
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying federal choiceof-law principles under FSIA). See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 242, 255–57.
65
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292.
66
Id. at 2292.
67
Id. at 2290 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
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68

refuses to endorse it. Third, the Court alludes to its decision in
69
Philippines v. Pimentel, suggesting that the linkage between official
immunity and foreign-state immunity concerns whether the state would
70
be an indispensable party. But that decision involves a rather unique set
of events where the state and private plaintiffs had competing claims
against a pool of assets seized from the former Philippine dictator—not
the typical stuff of which suits against foreign states or foreign officials
71
are made. In short, nothing in the Court’s opinion sheds much light on
identifying whether the suit against the government official qualifies as
the functional equivalent of a suit against the state.
The Court’s lack of guidance is especially troubling, given the
significance of the decision. For one thing, the answer to this question
determines whether the FSIA’s above-described entitlements apply in the
case. Of particular importance are the special rights of judicial access.
For example, a foreign state has a right to remove the case from state to
federal court; similarly, a foreign state has an immediate right of appeal
72
from an order denying a claim of immunity. If a suit against a foreign
government official does not qualify as the functional equivalent of a suit
against the state, then these rights presumably drop out (unless the
undeveloped federal common law of official immunity also contains these
entitlements too—a result that not only would amount to a massive
expansion of federal common law but would make the whole issue in
73
Samantar a somewhat academic exercise).
Samantar suggests that the FSIA’s special entitlements do not apply
to suits against foreign officials that do not qualify as the functional
equivalent of a suit against the state. In a seeming nod to government
defendants, the Court explains that the FSIA’s provisions on personal
74
jurisdiction and service of process do not apply in these cases. This,
according to the Court, should serve as a brake on suits against foreign
75
government officials. Jurisdiction rules may supply more of a brake
depending on what happens when the Court finally confronts whether
UNITED STATES § 66 (1965)).
68
Id. at 2290 n.15.
69
128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008).
70
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292.
71
See Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2286. Moreover, the argument presupposes that
federal procedural law will govern the indispensable party analysis. As I note
elsewhere, one particularly important consequence of Samantar is that it charts a path
to keep a case against foreign government officials out of federal court. See infra notes
82–83 and accompanying text.
72
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006); see, e.g., Eckert Int’l, Inc. v. Sovereign Democratic
Republic of Fiji, 32 F.3d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1994).
73
One recent appellate decision holds, with virtually no analysis, that denials of
post-Samantar official immunity under federal common law are immediately
appealable. See Ochoa Lizarbe v. Rivera Rondon, 402 F. App’x 834, at 837 (4th Cir.
2010).
74
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 n.20.
75
Id. at 2292.
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agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states are entitled to the
protections of the Due Process Clause’s limits on the exercise of personal
76
jurisdiction. As to service of process, however, the Court gets it exactly
backwards. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s view, serving process on a
private foreign defendant is far easier than serving process on the foreign
state. For one thing, service of process on foreign states is subject to rules
of “strict compliance,” whereas service of process rules on “agencies or
77
instrumentalities” (and other private defendants) is not as strict. For
another thing, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) (which governs most
instances of service of process on a foreign defendant) authorizes a
variety of forms of service, and courts have been especially creative to use
their powers under Rule 4(f)(3) to authorize a variety of creative
methods of service (like email and facsimile) that never would suffice
78
under the FSIA’s strict rules. Far from adding to the plaintiff’s burden
when suing an individual government officer, the Court’s holding in
Samantar lightens it.
A host of other considerations follow from whether the suit against
the foreign official is deemed to be the functional equivalent of a suit
against the state. For example, under the FSIA, a state can be subject to
79
suit if it waives the immunity. Where a suit against an individual official
is the functional equivalent of a suit against the state, can the state as the
80
de facto defendant waive the individual official’s immunity? What about
former officials? Further, the answer to the “functional equivalent”
question has important forum shopping implications. Prior to Samantar,
the FSIA-based approach to individual immunity at least had the
functional value of ensuring that a uniform immunity rule applied. One
could avoid the risk of inconsistent results in federal and state court

76
See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer., 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d
Cir. 2009) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not prevent the U.S. from
subjecting foreign states and instrumentalities to personal jurisdiction); Price v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
the same for foreign states only). If the Court embraces the Price–Frontera line, then
it’ll be harder to establish personal jurisdiction over government officials than
foreign states. But if the Court rejects Price–Frontera line, then there will be no greater
protection of individuals than foreign states. Moreover, malleability of personal
jurisdiction doctrines (particularly with imputation theories) means the contacts of
individual officers may not be so important.
77
See, e.g., Magness v. Russian Federation, 247 F.3d 609, 615–16 (5th Cir. 2001).
See also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 896–902.
78
See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir.
2002). See also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 823–25.
79
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006).
80
The State Department has taken the view that, in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Samantar, the foreign state could waive the former official’s immunity. See
Statement of Interest, supra note 62, at Ex. 1 (letter from Harold Koh, Legal Adviser
for the Dep’t of State to Tony West, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice
(Feb. 11, 2011)). Certainly nothing in the Court’s extremely narrow holding dictates
that rule (obviously, as a formal matter, issues of waiver were not before the Court).
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81

through the FSIA’s removal provision. After Samantar, the risk of forum
shopping became rampant—to keep a case in state court, just file in a
way to avoid section 1332 removal and structure the causes of action to
82
avoid federal claims. Wouldn’t that be a pretty airtight way of keeping a
case out of federal court despite the potentially profound impact of the
case on foreign relations? The effect may be greater pressure to push
more substantive federal common law into state court. This might ensure
uniformity but at the expense of any theoretical coherence, and at the
risk of undermining doctrines that balance the federal and state interests
83
in the allocation of judicial and legislative jurisdiction.
Here, other doctrines may provide a solution to the dilemma created
by the Court’s opinion. Two important doctrines—the act-of-state
doctrine and the foreign-sovereign-compulsion doctrine—may provide
84
the proper lens through which to view these issues. Both of those
doctrines, like the standard set forth in section 66 of the Restatement
(Second), concern the effect of decisions rendered by a United States
court on a foreign sovereign. The doctrines apply even when the foreign
sovereign is not a formal party to the case and, thus, provide an especially
85
apt analogy to the sort of fact pattern that Samantar presents. Tying the
two doctrines together and applying them in this context, one might
construct a test under which the FSIA’s protections will apply where the
suit might require a United States court to review the acts of a foreign
state taken within its territory or, alternatively, require a foreign state to
engage in some sort of conduct within its territory. For the logic of this
analogy to work, the standards must be more relaxed than those
necessary for either doctrine to apply (otherwise, the FSIA inquiry would

81

28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 489 (1983).
82
Assuming the case involves purely alien plaintiffs, then Article III would bar
removal by the alien defendant. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303
(1810).
83
See, e.g., Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (comityof-nations doctrine). Lower courts are currently divided over the extent to which
cases presenting foreign policy implications (whether grounded in comity or the actof-state doctrine) raise substantial questions of federal common law and, thereby, give
rise to federal jurisdiction. Compare Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368,
1376–78 (11th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that federal common law of foreign
relations could give rise to federal jurisdiction), with Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque
v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1088–90 (9th Cir. 2009) (act-of-state doctrine did
not give rise to federal jurisdiction), and Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795,
803 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal common law of foreign relations does not give rise to
federal jurisidiction), and In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100
F. Supp. 2d 31, 34–38 (D.D.C. 2000) (same).
84
See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (actof-state doctrine); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291, 1301–03 (D. Del. 1970) (foreign-sovereign-compulsion doctrine). See also
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 751–812.
85
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 751–812.
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be moot because the doctrines would likely necessitate dismissal of the
86
suit).
D. What’s the role of the executive branch?
As noted earlier, prior to the FSIA’s enactment, the executive branch
played a critical role in the immunity determination (albeit more
frequently with foreign states than with their agencies or
instrumentalities). To the extent Samantar holds that the pre-FSIA
common-law immunity still covers individual officers after the FSIA’s
enactment, does this framework also perpetuate the deference to the
executive branch that predated the FSIA’s enactment? In a variety of
recent contexts, the Court has indicated that the views of the executive
87
branch are entitled to at least some weight. This simply continues a
long-running debate in a variety of fields of international litigation about
88
the role of the executive branch. How does this operate in the
89
individual immunity context?
Under the Solicitor General’s view, the FSIA left untouched the
third-era approach to official immunity under which the executive
90
branch determined the immunity of foreign government officials. This
view is problematic for at least two reasons. As noted above, it is far from
91
clear that this common-law practice was so well established. Second,
even if one accepts the premise that official immunity had achieved some
sufficient degree of acceptance at the time of the FSIA’s enactment, it is
constitutionally suspect, at best, to suppose that the content of this law
depends on an executive determination (as opposed to judicial
determination). While the law’s meaning (whether statutory or common
law) might take into account the executive branch’s views (or even defer
to them), no area of law to my knowledge depends on the executive
92
branch’s interpretation to define its very content.
A more modest level of deference to the executive branch is
defended by analogy to both diplomatic immunity and head-of-state

86

This is the case unless, of course, one of the exceptions to the doctrine
applied. See id. at 791–806.
87
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).
88
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 18–20.
89
I explore these issues at greater length in a forthcoming symposium piece for
the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. See Rutledge, supra note 62.
90
See Brief for the United States, supra note 37, at 8–13. Under a more modest
version of this proposal, Chimène Keitner urges deference to status-based but not
conduct-based immunities. See Keitner, supra note 55.
91
See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text.
92
Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–
45 (1984). See also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (explaining the degree to which principles of Chevron
deference may be properly extended to foreign relations law).

Do Not Delete

8/11/2011 5:43 PM

606

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:3

93

immunity. Closer examination, however, reveals that those analogies
are especially inapt. Both of those doctrines involve a formal act of
recognition—recognition of a diplomat or recognition of the legitimate
head of state; such acts of recognition are understandably a
quintessentially executive function (ones where the nation needs to
speak with one voice) and, consequently, appropriate areas for deference
94
to the executive branch.
Determination of a foreign government official’s entitlement to
immunity stands on a very different footing. Such cases do not involve
any act of recognition by the executive branch; instead, they simply
involve matters about the formal organization of the foreign government
(and perhaps relatedly whether the government official was acting within
his or her scope of employment when engaging in the alleged act giving
rise to the claim). As to such matters there is no particularly compelling
need for the nation to speak with one voice, nor can the executive
branch profess to have any particular expertise in the matter (compared,
for example, with matters of diplomatic immunity). Thus, the case for
deference to the executive branch as to the foreign official’s entitlement
to immunity is especially weak.
This is not to suggest, however, that the executive branch has no role
to play in such suits. The executive branch still can play an important
role by informing the Court about the effect of such a suit on the foreign
relations of the United States. Thus, the executive branch certainly still
can urge dismissal on the ground that considerations of comity, political
95
question, or other grounds necessitate the Court to stay its hand. That
function, however, concerns the general assessment of a case’s impact on
the foreign relations of the United States and not the granular
determination of whether a foreign government official qualifies for
immunity under the common law.
IV. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DONE
As the foregoing critique of Samantar suggests, the Court correctly
held that the FSIA does not apply to individual officers but should not
have invented an immunity doctrine in the exercise of its power to make
federal common law. Instead, it should have held that individual
government officials are not, presently, entitled to official immunity.
Such a rule would have had three salutary consequences compared to the
rule announced by the Court. For one thing, it would have provided
clarity—litigants and courts would have immediately understood the
rule’s effect on jurisdiction and a defendant’s rights. Second, the rule
93

See Lewis S. Yelin, Head-of-State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 45 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L (forthcoming 2011).
94
The same is true of recognition of the state itself, part of the inquiry into a
state’s immunity under the FSIA. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 236–42.
95
See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).
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would have avoided the theoretical confusion over the source of the
Court’s power to make federal common law in this area. Third, the rule
(not unlike an information-forcing default rule) undoubtedly would have
forced the political branches to act and, thereby, take a more systematic
approach to the entire issue, as it did with the FSIA, rather than have the
96
doctrine develop incrementally, as Samantar anticipates. This forcing
effect would have been especially valuable, as it might have induced
Congress to take a fresh look at sovereign immunity law since the FSIA’s
enactment, particularly in light of the recently drafted United Nations
Convention on State Immunities and other efforts to achieve
97
harmonization in this area.
This proposal undoubtedly will prompt objections, and I address two
here. First, critics will claim that the rule leaves foreign government
officials exposed to new lawsuits. Of course, this objection is valid only if
one presupposes that the political branches would not respond to the
forcing effects of such a decision. Yet the FSIA demonstrates Congress’s
willingness to legislate in this area, and recent experience in other areas
suggests that Congress is prepared to act swiftly when it disagrees with a
98
non-constitutional decision of the Court. Moreover, as the Court itself
in Samantar noted, personal jurisdiction rules would still serve as an
effective constraint on suits against at least some foreign officials.
Second, critics will argue that such a rule would throw existing
litigation against foreign government officials into disarray. That
objection, however, is exaggerated. In the short term, the Court could
simply give prospective effect to its decision, as it has done in other

96

Regarding this forcing effect of judicial decisions on the actions undertaken by
coordinate branches of government, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002); Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in
the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 687–88 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1436 (1999);
Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 568 (2005).
97
See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004). In this
respect, defenders of Samantar have it wrong when they suggest that the decision was
necessary in order not to cause the United States to violate its obligations under
international law. But cf. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.3 (2010).
Indeed, by forcing the political branches to address squarely the scope of a foreign
government official’s immunity, it would have caused them to confront those
obligations directly and address them in a systematic fashion that better assured
compliance than the incremental, undeveloped approach taken by the Court.
98
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), superseded in
part by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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areas. Additionally, the executive branch could have intervened in
politically sensitive cases against foreign government officials and urged
their dismissal on prudential grounds. In the medium term, a legislative
fix could address this issue as well. Just as the political branches have the
100
authority to remove existing cases from federal court entirely, so too do
they have the power to extend sovereign immunity to defendants in
101
existing suits.
Ironically, in the same term that the Court decided Samantar, the
Court unanimously resolved another case involving federal jurisdiction.
There the Court wrote:
Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time
and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims,
but which court is the right court to decide those claims.
Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage
gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results
and settlements will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits.
102
Judicial resources too are at stake.
While the Court uttered those words in the context of the “principal
place of business” determination in diversity suits, they equally apply in
the context of jurisdictional determinations in cases against foreign
governments or their officials. Indeed, given the potential foreign
relations implications, the stakes are arguably far higher (and thus the
need for clear, workable rules far greater). Yet the Court in Samantar did
not heed its own advice and has bequeathed to lower courts (as well as
litigants) a confused and murky test that hardly supplies the clarity that
the Court described in Hertz as so essential. Unless the Court corrects its
course (or Congress intervenes), this disappointing decision only will
clutter the courts with distracting jurisdictional disputes for years to
come.
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